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II.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Order that is the subject of this appeal is a final order
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. The Utah
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

Pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, this appeal was transferred to the Court of
Appeals for disposition by order of the Utah Supreme Court dated
June 25, 1990.
III.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issues For Review and Standard of Review.

(a)
interest?

Did the district court err in awarding compound

The availability of interest is a question of law; the

reviewing court gives no deference to the district court's views
of legal questions, reviewing the decision instead for correctness.
See, Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
(b)

Did the district court err in entering an Order

granting relief exceeding the nature and issues raised by the
pleadings and not granted at the hearing?

Since this issue

involves only a legal principle and review of written material, the
district court's decision is subject to no deference.

See, Ron

Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d at 1385.

1

(c)

Did the district court err in awarding attorneys'

fees not compensable under the parties' contract?

The interpreta-

tion of a contract's provisions is a question of law; in reviewing
questions

of

law the district

reviewed de novo.

court's

legal conclusions

are

See, 50 West Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency

of Salt Lake, 784 P.2d

1162, 1171 (Utah 1989); In re Infant

Anonymous 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988).

Cf.

Carr v. Enoch

Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Utah App. 1989).
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

After a bench trial, the district court entered a money
judgment

against

Appellants

Appellees (the "Sharps").

("White Pine")

and

in

favor

of

That September 28, 1988 Judgment (the

"Judgment") was the subject of an earlier appeal by White Pine in
this Court's Case No. 880710-CA.1

All issues involved in this

appeal involve post-judgment actions taken by the district court
during the pendency of that appeal. During White Pine's appeal of
the judgment it posted a supersedeas bond and obtained a stay of
execution (the "Stay").

This Stay continued unchallenged for a

1

This Court's disposition of that case is now the subject of
a pending Petition for Writ of Certiorari before the Utah Supreme
Court, Petition No. 900360.
2

year, when the Sharps moved the district court to supplement the
Judgment and to increase the amount of the bond.
The parties briefed the issues and thereafter argued their
positions at a hearing. At the hearing, the district court granted
the Sharps relief "as prayed".

Thereafter, the Sharps presented

an order that was legally incorrect in two respects:

(1) it

provided for compound interest; (2) it vacated the previously
imposed Stay, an issue that was not raised by the pleadings, not
raised by the parties, and not ruled on by the district court.
Even though White Pine filed specific objections to that order, the
district court executed it as submitted.
Because of an obvious legal error in that initial order (it
included future interest) the Sharps submitted an amended order
that did not provide

for future interest, but was otherwise

unchanged. White Pine again objected, and the district court again
executed the order as submitted.

White Pine appeals from those

parts of the amended order providing for compound interest and
vacating the Stay.
In addition, White Pine appeals from the district court's
award of attorneys' fees to the Sharps on the ground that award is
contrary to the parties' agreement, premature, and beyond the
district court's subject matter jurisdiction.

3

B.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

On December 16, 1988, after the Judgment was entered, White
Pine moved the district court for a stay of the Judgment pending
appeal and for approval of a supersedeas bond in the amount of
$65,158.77,

which

included

the

shortfall

calculated

Judgment, along with interest through June 30, 1989.

in

the

(R. 1509).

The Sharps opposed that motion, arguing the supersedeas bond should
be $310,287.31. (R. 1561). Thereafter, the district court set the
amount of the bond at $79,793.36, and on January 20, 1989 White
Pine

posted

(R. 1742).

a

supersedeas

bond

in

that

increased

amount.

Once again, on January 23, 1989, the Sharps objected,

arguing that White Pine "should be required to obtain a reputable
surety with a solid background upon which the Sharps may rely for
security

against

appeal . . . "

losses

resulting

from

an

unsuccessful t

(R. 1700).

Finally, based upon the stipulation of White Pine and the
Sharps, the district court entered its Order Re: Supersedeas Bond
on March 17, 1989 (the "Stay").
two critical matters:

(R. 1725). That Order established

(1) the form of security for the bond

(Lot 1, White Pine Ranches Subdivision Phase I, as recorded in the
offices of the Summit County Recorder) was determined to be good
and sufficient; and (2) Lot 1 would be considered for security for

4

increases, if any, in the supersedeas bond amount at a hearing to
be held after November 19, 1989.

(R. 1726).

On November 3, 1989, in accordance with para. 3 of that March
17, 1989 Order, the Sharps filed their Request for Hearing on (1)
a previously filed Motion to Supplement Judgment; (2) their request
for additional attorneys' fees; and

(3) their request for an

increase in the supersedeas bond amount.

(R. 1765).

On December

11, 1989, the Sharps filed their Second Motion to Supplement
Judgment and Motion to Increase Liability on Bond, in which the
Sharps again requested, inter alia, the district court to increase
the amount of the supersedeas bond.

(R. 1774). At no time did the

Sharps request the district court to order White Pine to post
additional, or different, security.
The district court heard that Motion on February 12, 1990.
At the conclusion of the hearing on that Motion, the district court
granted the Sharps' Motion "as prayed".

(R. 2059, 2135).

When the Sharps presented their proposed Order on the Sharps'
Second Motion to White Pine's counsel, however, the Order said
nothing about increasing the amount of the supersedeas bond;
instead it required White Pine "to post additional security" in
the amount of $136,800.99 on or before March 15, 1990.

(R. 2073;

Add. 11). That Order (the "Initial Order") was entered on March

5

16, 1990, the same day White Pine served its objections to the
Order-

(R. 2078).

It is important to note that the Initial Order vacated the
district

court's

year-old

Order

Staying

Proceedings

additional security was not posted by March 15, 1990.

if

such

In other

words, the prior Stay was effectively vacated before the order
vacating it was enteared. The Initial Order was entered even though
the Sharps never requested that the Stay be vacated, and the issue
was neither raised nor ruled on at the February 12, 1990 hearing.
(R. 2110-2137).

In other words, White Pine never knew there was

any possibility the Stay would be vacated until after the district
court signed the erroneous Initial Order.
On March 16, 1990, White Pine also served its Motions for
Continuance of Order Staying Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal
and Approval of Supersedeas Bond.

(R. 2078). As set forth in that

Motion, the surety had theretofore filed a financial statement with
the district court indicating that the net worth of the surety in
March 1989 totaled $220,000.00, more than (1) the sum of the
initial Judgment and (2) the increase ordered by the district
court.

(R. 2082).

Accordingly, White Pine requested the district

court to enter an Order (1) staying enforcement of the judgment
pending final determination by this Court; and (2) declaring that

6

the

existing

security

be

considered

compliance with the Judgment and stay.

adequate,

and

in

full

(R. 2083).

On April 16, 1990, White Pine filed its Motion for Relief from
Judgment on the grounds that the Initial Order exceeded the relief
requested by the Sharps, and accordingly was void.

(R. 2098). The

Initial Order provided for future interest through August 1, 1990,
and in its supporting memorandum, White Pine pointed out that it
was erroneous for the Initial Order to award future interest.
(R. 2106).

In the meantime, on April 30, 1990, the Sharps served

their proposed Amended Order omitting the award of future interest.
(R. 2203; Add. 22). On May 7, 1990 the district court announced
it would execute the Amended Order upon its presentation, and
otherwise denied White Pine's Motion.

(R. 2168).

On May 1, 1990, six weeks after the Initial Order had been
entered, the Sharps filed their memorandum in opposition to White
Pine's motion for a continuance of the Stay and, for the first
time, objected
(R. 2159).

to the

sufficiency

of the existing

security.

On May 8, 1990, White Pine filed its reply, (1) point-

ing out that the Sharps never objected to the sufficiency of the
security until April 30, 1990, and (2) requesting an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the real property presently securing
the bond was sufficient pending appeal.

7

(R. 2170-2173).

White Pine further demonstrated in its reply that the Sharps
were merely re-litigating arguments they had already made in their
January 1989 objection to the initial bond.

As pointed out in

White Pine's reply, "the form and nature of the security has been
approved by the Court, and its acceptability is now the law of the
case.

The only issue remaining is whether the security is suffi-

cient to guarantee the payment of unsecured

fees, costs and

interest, which the Court has found to be $216,594.34 as of
August 1, 1990."

(R. 2172-2173).

On May 11, 1990, White Pine filed its present appeal of the
Initial Order (R. 2194) pursuant to an order extending White Pine's
Time for Appeal (R. 2095).

Three days later, on May 14, 1990, the

district court entered the Amended Order re: Defendants' Second
Motion to Supplement Judgment and Motion to Increase Liability on
Bond (the "Amended Order") (R. 2197; Add. 16).
The Amended

Order corrected

the future

interest problem

contained in the Initial Order, but it did not correct the remaining deficiencies. Accordingly, White Pine objected to the Amended
Order before it was entered (R. 2175) and, thereafter, on May 24,
1990

filed

its Amended Notice of Appeal

for the purpose of

appealing the Amended Order (R. 2217).
The Amended Order states, at paragraph 2:
The Judgment entered in this matter on
September 26, 1988 is hereby supplemented
8

through February 12, 1990, by the amount of
$231,636.97
for
a
total
judgment
of
$938,053.02 as of February 12, 1990.
(R. 2198; Add. 9) (emphasis added).

This provision results in the

impermissible compounding of interest.
The Amended Order also granted the Sharps their attorneys'
fees through October 31, 1989, even though the Sharps had not yet
prevailed in any appeal —

a condition precedent of the Judgment

for an award of any additional attorneys' fees.

In that regard,

the Judgment provided, in pertinent part:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that this Judgment shall be supplemented and
augmented in the amount of the Sharps'
reasonable attorney's fees as established by
affidavit and as incurred after August 31,
1988, in preparation of the Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any
post-trial
motions, in collecting
said
Judgment by execution or otherwise, and after
prevailing in any appeal.
(R. 2183; Add. 4) (emphasis added).
Moreover, under the Amended Order the Stay of Execution
Pending Appeal was lifted as of March 15, 1990, two months before
the Amended Order was entered on May 14, 1990. (R. 2198; Add. 17).
The Initial Order, which was entered March 16, 1990, contained the
same language:
Plaintiffs are ordered to post additional security as a
supersedeas bond for the continued stay of the execution
of the Judgment pursuant to the Order Re: Supersedeas
Bond dated March 17, 1989 in the amount of $136,800.99
on or before March 15, 1990. If Plaintiffs fail to do
9

so by March 15, 1990, the Order Staying Proceedings dated
January 31, 1989 shall be automatically vacated and the
Sharps shall be allowed to proceed to execute on the
Judgment entered in the above captioned matter.
(R.2073-74, 2202; Add. 11-12; 21).
Both orders, therefore, required White Pine to post increased
security before either order was entered, thereby precluding any
opportunity for White Pine to comply with the orders and avoid a
lifting of the stay.,

The district court was never requested to

order a lifting of the stay, and that matter was never addressed
at the February 12, 1990 hearing on the Sharps' motion (R. 21102137) .
At the time the Amended Order was entered on May 14, 1990,
White Pine's Motions for Continuance of Order Staying Enforcement
of

Judgment

Pending Appeal

and Approval

of

Supersedeas

Bond

(R. 2082) had been pending before the district court for almost two
months. Even though White Pine was entitled to a stay of execution
on the money Judgment as a matter of right,2 and had requested a
hearing on the Stay and the adequacy of the security for the
previously filed supersedeas bond (R. 2173), the district court
declined to hold such a hearing or to permit White Pine to argue
its entitlement to the Stay.

Instead, the district court simply

2

See Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah App.
1987) and discussion at Point VI, B, infra.
10

entered the Amended Order lifting the Stay, without giving White
Pine any opportunity either to demonstrate that the existing
security was adequate or to post some other adequate security•
As a result of all these actions by the district court, White
Pine claims it committed three errors:

(1) the district court

erred in ordering compound interest; (2) the district court erred
in entering an order lifting the stay even though that relief was
never requested, never argued, and never ruled upon at the hearing;
and (3) the district court erred in awarding additional attorneys'
fees.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The orders prepared by the Sharps' counsel and entered by the
district court erroneously allow compound interest.
The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
revoke or lift the Stay once the Stay had been approved; even if
the district court had that power, it could not award relief that
had not been requested in the Sharps' pleadings, had not been
briefed or argued by the parties, and had not been granted in the
district court's oral ruling.
Finally, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to supplement the Sharps' attorneys' fees once White Pine had
appealed the Judgment.

Even if the district court had such

11

authority, it failed to make the findings of fact required in
connection with an award of attorneys' fees.
All of these legal errors by the district court make the
orders entered by the district court void. Accordingly, this Court
should reverse the orders appealed from.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE AMENDED ORDER IMPERMISSIBLY COMPOUNDS INTEREST.

Compound interest is "interest on interest, in that accrued
interest is added periodically to the principal, and interest is
computed upon the new principal thus formed; . . . "

Mountain

States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah App.
1989) (quoting, 45 Am.Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 76 (1969)).
Due to the general judicial disfavor of interest on interest,
compound interest is not permitted unless the parties contract
otherwise, or

unless

the

statute

providing

judgments expressly requires compounding.3

for

interest

on

See, e.g., Watkins &

Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979); Estate Landscape
& Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 793 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah App. 1990); Neale, 783 P.2d at 555.
In this

case, the original

September

26, 1988

Judgment

separately listed various amounts owing by categories, along with

interest.

Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 does not permit
See, Estate Landscape, 793 P.2d at 420.
12

compound

interest rates thereon or per diems for each separate amount.
Nowhere

in that Judgment

is there a total

judgment amount.

The Amended Order, however, purports to

"supplement" the

(R. 2182; Add. 3).

original Judgment by the total amount of $231,636.97, $151,670.63
of which represents interest.

(R. 2199-2200; Add. 18-19).

Unlike

the Judgment, however, the Amended Order included a "total Judgment
of $938,053.02."

(R. 2198; Add. 17).

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4, this total Judgment
amount of $938,053.02 —

including the $151,670.63 of interest

included therein — bears interest from and after February 12, 1990
at the annual rate of 12%.
required

to

pay

Thus, every year White Pine will be

$18,200.36

of

compounded

interest

on

the

$151,670.63 of interest that the Amended Order added to the
original

Judgment.

Under the Neale definition

of

"compound

interest", the Amended Order unquestionably creates a situation
where interest is impermissibly compounded.
On May 8, 1990, a week before the Amended Order was entered,
White Pine filed an objection to the Amended Order which read, in
pertinent part, as follows:
The Amended Order purports to create a
judgment as of February 12, 1990 in the total
amount of $938,053.02. Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 15-1-4.
This total sum, including
interest, would bear interest at 12%. This
13

constitutes an impermissible compounding of
interest.
(R. 2177).

White Pine even went so far as to submit to the

district court a proposed Supplemented Judgment which avoided the
compounding problem.

(R. 2187-2190).

The district court nevertheless entered the Amended Order
which has been designated in the court records as a Judgment (R.
2197; Add. 16).

By their drafting, the Sharps have created a

Judgment which gives them $18,200.36 per year of compound interest
to which they are not entitled.

That award is contrary to law and

should be reversed.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIFTING THE
IMPOSED STAY

PREVIOUSLY

As with the compounding of interest, the Sharps inserted in
the Amended Order a provision lifting the Stay which is legally
improper.

The first time White Pine had any idea the Sharps were

seeking to have the Stay lifted was when White Pine's counsel
received the Sharps' proposed Initial Order.

Once again, White

Pine objected explicitly to the inclusion of this provision (R.
2177-78), but the district court nevertheless executed the Sharps'
order.

During the pendency of its appeal of this money Judgment,

White Pine was entitled to the stay as a matter of right upon the
posting of adequate security. See, Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d
1026, 1027 (Utah App. 1987).

The district court accordingly erred
14

as a matter of law in lifting the Stay in the absence of any
request that it do so and in denying White Pine a hearing on the
issues surrounding the issuance of a supersedeas bond.

Moreover,

once the Stay was granted, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to revoke it.
1.

The Sharps' Pleadings Did Not Request That The Stay Be Lifted.
In their November 3, 1989 Request for Hearing, the Sharps

requested only an increase in the amount of the supersedeas bond.
Similarly, the Sharps' December 11, 1989 Second Motion requested
only that the amount of the bond be increased.

Indeed, after White

Pine filed its objections to the Sharps' Second Motion, the Sharps
replied:

"It is not unreasonable to require [White Pine] to

increase the amount of their supersedeas bond."

(R. 2042).

(emphasis added).
The Sharps made reference to increasing the amount of the bond
three different times.

They never, however, requested (1) any

different security, or (2) that the Stay be lifted.

In fact, at

the hearing on the Sharps' Second Motion, their counsel framed this
issue in terms of only "why the bond should not be increased."
(R. 2113).

All the argument at the February 12, 1990 hearing on

the Sharps' Second Motion focused on the increased amount, if any,
of the supersedeas bond.

15

When the Sharps' counsel submitted the Initial Order, however,
it contained two provisions that were devastating to White Pine,
and which had been totally unaddressed by the Sharps' pleadings:
(1) White Pine was ordered to post additional security in the
amount of $136,800.90; and (2) the Stay was automatically lifted
if White Pine had not filed the additional bond by March 15, 1990,
two days before the Initial Order was even entered.

Because the

posting of additional security and the lifting of the Stay had
never been requested, argued, or ruled on, White Pine was unfairly
and unjustifiably surprised by the inclusion of these provisions
in the Initial Order.
This Court has ruled such an order is void as a matter of law.
See, Hendricks v. Interstate Homes, Inc., 745 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah
App.

1989).

The

rule

announced

in

Hendricks

reflects

a

longstanding recognition that Utcih courts have no subject matter
jurisdiction to grant relief not sought by the pleadings.
In Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Bragg, 67 Utah 60, 245 P. 966
(1925), the Bank sought to enforce two mortgages which had been
executed on behalf of minors by their guardian.
executed

those mortgages

authorization,

and

the

only after receiving
district

court

The guardian
district court

thereafter

ordered

foreclosure.

In the minors' appeal of the foreclosure decree the

bank

that

argued

no

pleading, petition,
16

affidavit

or

other

triggering device was necessary to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 973. In reversing the foreclosure decree, the Court wrote:
It is fundamental that a petition or pleading of some
kind is the juridical means of investing a court with
jurisdiction of subject-matter to adjudicate it, and a
judgment which is beyond or not supported by pleadings
must fall. . . . A fact apparent from the mandatory
record, showing that fundamental law was disregarded in
the establishment of the judgment, will render it null
and void for all purposes.
Id.
In Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926), the Court
addressed the extent to which a California custody decree was
entitled to full faith and credit.

In its discussion of that

issue, the Court recognized that
there is no principle better established than what is
not juridically presented cannot be juridically decided.
Just as elemental is it that pleadings are the juridical
means of investing a court with jurisdiction of the
subject-matter to adjudicate it and that a judgment or
decree beyond or not within them is a nullity, for the
court is bound by its record.
These are immutable
elements.
Id. at 104.

See also, Vovles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913,

914 (1930) ("it would be improper in any case to award a judgment
for what is not demanded.")
All these authorities compel the conclusion that the district
court's lifting of the Stay was erroneous.

White Pine had no

notice whatsoever that the Sharps were seeking to have the Stay
lifted.

All of the Sharps' pleadings requested only that the
17

amount of the bond be increased. White Pine had no opportunity to
present any evidence regarding the propriety of the lifting of that
Stay or the adequacy of the existing bond. Instead, White Pine was
unfairly, and without warning, devastated by an order lifting the
Stay two days before the Order lifting it was even entered.
process and controlling authority require more than this.

Due

Parties

and their counsel cannot be permitted to put any result they desire
in a proposed order in the hope that the order will be signed, as
happened here.

The lifting of the Stay was reversible

error.

In Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah App. 1987), this
Court

considered

the appropriate

standards

to be applied

in

granting stays pending appeal. In the case of money judgments such
as the one the district court granted the Sharps, an appellant is
entitled to a stay as a matter of right upon the posting of a
supersedeas bond.

See, id. at 1027.

In this case White Pine had

posted that bond a year earlier and was expecting only to increase
the amount of that bond.

It was never given that opportunity,

however, because the Initial Order required it to post additional
security two days before the Order requiring it to do so was even
entered.

By inserting this unprayed-for, unbriefed and unawarded

provision into the Initial Order, the Sharps and the district court
divested White Pine of the Stay it was entitled to as a matter of
right.
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2.

The District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Lift
Or Revoke The Stay,
Moreover, Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d) permits a district court only

to approve a supersedeas bond. It is silent regarding the district
court's power to revoke a stay once it becomes effective.

The

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, interpreting the functionally identical federal rule, addressed this issue
in In re Fed. Facilities Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.
1955).

In that case the court directly confronted the issue

whether a district court has "a continuing power to revoke a stay
previously granted". Id. at 654. In specifically holding district
courts have no such power to revoke stays, the court wrote:
When the supersedeas becomes effective, the appellant
obtains thereby a valuable right to have the status quo
preserved until his appeal is heard and decided. Indeed,
this right may be more valuable to him than the right of
appeal, since we can conceive of a situation in which
execution of the judgment while an appeal is pending
might render the appeal moot. The provisions of the
cited rules seem clearly to contemplate that the trial
court's reserved power is exhausted when the court
approves a supersedeas bond and the stay becomes
effective. A different interpretation would have the
effect of leaving a litigant's rights in a supersedeas
ever subject to the jurisdiction of the trial judge until
the appeal is finally decided.
We conclude, therefore, that District Court had no
jurisdiction to vacate the stay order previously entered
or to take any action, for, on perfection of the appeal
and entry of the order for supersedeas, jurisdiction over
the supersedeas as well as of the judgment was
transferred to this court.
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It follows that the order purporting to vacate the stayin a cause already on appeal was void ab initio,
and that
the stay continued in effect•
Id. at 655-56.
Because the Initial Order and the Amended Order lifted the
stay, a result not raised or even suggested

in the Sharps'

pleadings, and because the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to revoke the Stay, this Court should reverse the
district court's revocation and lifting of the Stay.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO THE SHARPS.

As demonstrated in the preceding section of this brief, the
district court granted a Stay which was irrevocable during the
pendency of White Pine's appeal. The district court's January 31,
1989 Order Staying Proceedings itself reflects the permanency of
the Stay:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants, their agents or
attorneys, are stayed and enjoined from undertaking any
actions to execute, sell or notice for sale the property
which is the subject of this action or take any other
action to execute or enforce their rights under the
judgment and that such stay shall remain in effect
pending resolution of plaintiffs' appeal, which is
currently pending in the Utah Court of Appeals, Appellate
No. 880710-CA.
(R. 1704).
That Stay order continued:

"However, defendants may schedule

another hearing on or after November 12, 1989 to review the bond
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amount,"

(R. 1704).

This sentence grew out of a provision in the

Judgment which provides:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the
amount of the Sharps reasonable attorney's fees as
established by affidavit and as incurred after August 31/
1988 in preparation of the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment, in responding to any post-trial motions, in
collecting said Judgment by execution or otherwise, and
after prevailing in any appeal.
(R. 2183; Add. 4 ) .
The Judgment, therefore, circumscribed the Sharps' entitlement
to additional attorneys' fees. The Sharps could only recover their
fees incurred after August 31, 1988 in connection with three
specified activities, and only after prevailing in any appeal. By
its terms, the Sharps were entitled to attorneys' fees in these
three limited areas only after the appellate process had been
concluded in their favor.
result.

Any contrary reading creates an absurd

If the Sharps do not prevail on appeal, and if the

district court's Judgment is ultimately reversed, the Sharps will
not be entitled to attorneys fees, and any interim award will
become a meaningless gesture. Furthermore, as demonstrated below,
the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to order
such supplementation during the appellate process.
White Pine expressed all these concerns in its December 27,
1989 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion to

21

Supplemental Judgment and Motion to Increase Liability on Bond.
(R. 1886-92).

It specifically pointed out that in the event of an

award of interim fees, "new appealcible issues may be created, which
may require the filing of a second notice of appeal.

In the

interest of judicial economy and because of the Court's order
staying these proceedings until after [White Pine's] appeal is
concluded, [the Sharps'] motion to supplement judgment should be
denied."

(R. 1888). White Pine also pointed out that the November

19, 1989 date was selected in the belief that the appeal would be
concluded by that time (R. 1887).
1.

The District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To
Supplement The Judgment, Or To Award Additional Attorneys'
Fees.
The

foregoing

events

make

clear

that

all

concerned

contemplated any supplementation of the Judgment would occur only
if and after the Sharps prevailed on appeal. This is not only the
plain language of the Judgment; it is the result dictated by law.
It has long been established in Utah that a district court is
divested of subject matter jurisdiction over a case while it is
under advisement on appeal.

See, White v. State of Utah, 137

U.A.R. 3, 3-4 (Utah 1990).

This rule is in accord with other

jurisdictions.

See, e.g., Parks v. Atlanta Pub. School Sys. Bd.

of Educ. , 168 Ga. App. 572, 309 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1983) (trial court
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judges have no jurisdiction to modify or supplement a judgment in
any way once a notice of appeal has been filed).
In this case, the district court ignored this fundamental
principle of law, expressed in its own Judgment.

Any purported

supplementation is void because the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to amend, modify or supplement the Judgment
while it was on appeal.

This result is not only compelled by the

law; it also makes sense.
As pointed out in White Pine's objection to the requested
supplementation, the award of additional attorneys' fees while the
Judgment was on appeal would inevitably lead to a second appeal.
That is exactly what occurred in this instance.

Presumably, the

Sharps presently feel free to go back again to the district court
to

obtain

additional

supplementation.

Such

an

award

would

inevitably lead to yet a third appeal. Under the process followed
by the Sharps and the district court there could be several interim
awards, followed by several appeals.

If the Utah Supreme Court

grants White Pine's petition for certiorari and ultimately reverses
the underlying Judgment, however, all such interim activity will
become meaningless.

This is an inefficient, wasteful, and absurd

process.
Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to supplement the Judgment, this Court should rule that the Initial
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Order and Amended Order are void and of no force • In that regard,
it should direct the district court to take no further steps to
amend, modify or supplement the Judgment until White Pine's appeal
of that Judgment is concluded•
2.

The Attorneys' Fees Awarded By The District Court Were Legally
Improper.
The

Judgment

specifically

awarded

attorneys' fees in three areas only:

the

Sharps

additional

(1) preparing Findings,

Conclusions, and the Judgment itself; (2) responding to post-trial
motions; and

(3) collecting on the

otherwise. (R. 2183; Add. 4 ) .

judgment by execution or

The Sharps did not appeal these

limitations on their recovery, and they are now bound by them.
The documents submitted by the Sharps in connection with their
request

for

additional

attorneys

fees

are

an

undecipherable

compilation of activities that in no way assign activities to those
categories (R. 1514-58; 1791-1880).

Although the Sharps claimed

an entitlement to an additional $104,906.23 in attorneys fees, (R.
1515; 1792), the vast majority of enumerated activities bear no
apparent relevance to the areas where the Judgment authorized
supplementation.
The most obvious example of the Sharps' attempts to go beyond
the express terms of the Judgment is their effort to receive
payment of attorneys' fees for time spent obtaining consents to
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compel White Pine to pay for such attorneys' fees
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To
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i hi'

Judgment.
Other examples

rr

i

h*

Sharps' request

express

terms

hit.- •

I

1908)

2) preparing for and attending conferences

development

Judgment

: r f^->^
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jnspl
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rine

D
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mciu

no

regarc

, prospective

^*

ruyers
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"interested" buyer ..: White Pine Ranches
and negotiating

-*-* \*
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lesuxv
Sharps

?

May 24, 1956, in favor of James H. Newton and Bertha N. Newton
(R. 1951-53;

1959);

and

(5) responding

to

J,

Richard

Rees'

bankruptcy (R. 1901-04; 1908-12; 1915; 1951; 1963; 1987-88; 1997);
(6) inspecting Park City Property (R. 1980); and (7) preparing
motions on the Sharps' behalf (R. 2008).
Contrary to the district court's interim awards, the Judgment
did not entitle the Sharps to recover attorneys' fees for every
single act taken by their counsel.

Due to the lack of any

specificity, neither White Pine nor this Court could reasonably
determine which of the Sharps' attorneys' fees are related to (1)
preparing the findings, conclusions and judgment; (2) responding
to post-trial motions; or (3) collecting the Judgment by execution
or otherwise.
In this regard, the district court did discillow some of the
more blatant examples of unauthorized fees totalling approximately
$25,000.00.

(R. 2071-72; 2135; 2198-99; Add. 10, 18-19).

unsubstantiated, broad-brush approach is insuffxcient.

This

The Utah

Supreme Court has written that "on a number of occasions, we have
held that attorney fees should be awarded on the basis of evidence
and that findings of fact should be made which support the award."
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985).
This Court has reversed attorneys' fees awards when the
district

court

failed

to

make
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the

necessary

findings

and

conclusions.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

This appeal has resulted from the failure of the Sharps to
recognize or honor even the most elemental limitations on their
ability to obtain relief. Ignoring the long-standing and universal
rule prohibiting the compounding of interest, they submitted an
order awarding $18,000 per year in compound interest.
The Sharps also ignored the long-standing axiom that a court
cannot grant relief that has not been requested by the pleadings
when they submitted an order revoking and lifting the Stay, a
remedy they had not requested, which had not been briefed or
argued, and which the district court was not authorized in any
event to grant.
The district court erred when it executed the Initial Order
and the Amended Order notwithstanding these legal principles.

In

addition, the district court lack€Kl subject matter jurisdiction to
execute either order.

Finally, the district court committed

reversible legal error when it entered its approval of the Sharps'
disputed attorneys' fees without making any findings.
All the foregoing legal errors on the part of the district
court require this Court to reverse the orders.
DATED:

August 27, 1990.
ANDERSON & WATKINS

By fiiUM. tlk/ftD
Robert M. Andersoil"^
Glen D. WatkirisL-J^
Bruce Wycoff^
Attorneys for Appellants
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JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
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corporation,

J .idae :. Dennis F r e d e r i c k
Defendants.
JOHN C. SHARP, ana GERALDINE
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INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,
and PAUL H. LANDES, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants

John

C.

and Geraldine

Y. Sharp

(hereinafter

the

"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F.
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

Investment

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

"Felton"), J. Richard

Corporation

appearing

Rees and Saunders

by counsel

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.
j defendant Kenneth R. Norton

Robert

Robert M.

Counterclaim

("Norton") appeared through his

I counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.

Defendant Associated Title was never served

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,
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NOW., THEREFORE,
CREED

IT

plaintiffs 1

that

IS

HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

Comp I a \ ' ' "rtinnij."..el,

.'.NI'1 DEcause

M

of

action. .
IT

IS

FURTHER

Saunders, Feltor
deb^'-"""J1,

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

nterstate Rent a 3 s ,

101

that

- *r* in -

severally, to the Sharps in the following

amounts:
a.

i.

Principal:
I « t «r11>st

$

' '
" ' ,»if ,|h

I"1! rU;l3 , 54

March 22, 1988:
iii

Late payment charge:

together with
$183 32 J

-i s J

i i

TOT A I •:

i SB"", 6 4 2 46

interest

-

thereon

at, the per diem

rate of

: March 22 f 1988.

i.

xrus

ii.

rnm*

,c

"

Costs:

$

1,803 SO

S

2,881.04

' tc rreys ! fees through

iii

August 31, 1988;
i.uyeilie:
annum

.5

wiiii

from

interest

the date

of

144 ,088.75

thereon

it the

expenditure by

:ate

M:

I'* i er

the sharps

until

paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

20,368.62

together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as
provided

by

Jaw

'..»•;» • 'j^'-o'ipr1

property
,.

-st

t v,p^

thereon

»i-rr
at

the

i.
rate

j -> O:I
<"

f

and

12% per

annum.

_3_

ooooo.i

GOl^f

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of
the Sharps' reasonable attorneyfs fees as established by affidavit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal.
IT

IS FURTHER

Temporary
matter

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

Restraining

Order

entered

AND DECREED

that

the

in the above captioned I

by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4,

1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dissolved.

The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the

bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in the amount of S2,400.00 and against the security posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court
in the amount of $28,570.63, and for which amounts the plaintiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject
premises.

i

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as
described

in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches

Phase I and the unplatted orooertv more particularlv described
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that

-4-
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of this action, then said

\e:<?

premises

expenses cf

sale

and

m a i n t e n a n c e , \IIPI

assessments and/ :-. insurance premiurns , tcge r: he t ,., ,„ th a :c:ue^
interest the:

i

,•

v

saic sums
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this Cou: i snhn HI* t
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.

Court"s fur ther order.
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded
a

personal

judgment

against

Saunders,

Felton,

Norton

and

Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
i

IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND DECREED

that

the

ii Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary, water and sewer systems on
jl White Pine Ranches Phase I for

a connection

fee of $2,000

ij each.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a nonj exclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude,
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit HAM attached hereto
II and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and pur-

II
|| chasers

thereof

(including

the

•, guests, heirs and successors
i(

Sharps)

and

their invitees,

in interest, for utilities and

for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and

;j egress

for vehicular

and pedestrian

access over, under and

! j

•; across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the reii corded, final plat.of.White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with
I the Summit County Recorder;

and a non-exclusive appurtenant

easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches
-6-
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wners
Sharps)

and purchasers

I fi -

i! -u i us

a
. .

. nterest

;_

war*:

!ii J water systems over, under and across the
subject

premises

-

"''

M

"

corner

of *:Vj

FURTHER

~^..*

' -

u ' i i e». J i d e d p l a t ,! w!" .te Pin-:.'

,r.

ORDERED,

Tt

ADJUDGED

AND DECREED

-

_nant?
- :*.^-

-;r,-e;<cl-s; ^ easements

-S. »

that

the

recorded

* Summit Cc-r.i/

:

ec::d-

set :c;tn aoove

rema:
\ T 6

„ ,\ <2 L *;'

Sal
other

HHIM-MI

I

. -

shall

the southwest

. has A ""

IT
fir*

( l

D e±*v

•creage
r5

near

subsequent
than

complete

redemptior

unplatted

t;.e

:D^ecfr

-•-rises

declaration

-exclus; -• easement

_..

:
~. ^

acreage.

DATED -

yJoXdar:

of

11 f 'S

t.::.

. ,_•
c:

e

^edempti

her
tinguishmen.

z:

f" 6

_
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 1988.
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Tfhrd judicial District

Donald J. Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222

MAR 1 6 1990
\

^Jb*i/r

LAKE COUNTY

Attorneys for Defendants Sharp
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al.,

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS1
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO
INCREASE LIABLITY ON BOND

Plaintiffs,
-vJOHN C. SHARP, et al.,
Defendants,
JOHN C. SHARP, et al.
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C87-1621
-vJudge J. Dennis Frederick
ROBERT FELTON, et al.,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

Defendants1

Second

Motion

to

Supplement

Judgment

and

Motion to Increase Liability on Bond came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on Monday,
the 12th day of February, 1990 at the hour of 10:30 a.m.

The

Sharps were represented by their counsel Donald J. Winder and

000008

Kathy A, F. Davis.

Plaintiffs were represented by their coun-

sel Robert M. Anderson and Mark Gaylord.

The Court, having

reviewed the pleadings and memoranda on file herein, having
heard the arguments of counsel, having received the proffers
of counsel for the Sharps, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Taxes on Lot 1 as described in the final recorded

plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I in the principal amount of
$2,271.48 plus penalties and interest thereon be paid on or
before March 15, 1990.

If the plaintiffs fail to pay the

taxes due and owing on Lot 1 by March 15, 1990, the Order
Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 shall be automatically vacated and defendants shall be allowed to proceed to
execute on the Judgment and this Order entered herein.

Subse-

quent to the Courtfs ruling, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Payment or Property Taxes Pursuant to the Court's Order dated
February 22, 1990.
2.

The Judgment entered in this matter on September 26,

1988 and the Order Re: Supersedeas Bond entered on March 17,
1989 are hereby supplemented through August 1, 1990 in the
following amounts:
a.

Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in-

curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plaintiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants'

-2-
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Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary"): "Settlement" in the
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $84.00;
"Tracy Collins Appeal" in the amount of $24,381.51

(for a

total of $24,938.89);
b.

The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment

from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the
attorney's

fees, court

costs or

trustee's

fees were paid

through September 26, 1983 as follows:
(1) Principal from 3/2/88
to 9/26/88:
(2) Attorney's fees:
(3) Court costs:
(4) Trustee's fees:
TOTAL:
c.

$34,464.16
$ 5,800.77
$
249.63
$
230.93
$40,745.49

The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on

payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment
from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through August 1,
1990 as follows:
(1) Principal ($183.32 x
674 days):
(2) Attorney's fees:
Paid Prior to Judgment
(Second Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom)
($28.20 x 274 days)
Paid Post-Judgment
(Third Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom)
(3) Court costs ($.79 x
674 days):
(4) Trustee's fees ($.49 x
674 days):
TOTAL:
d.

$123,557.68

$11,287.91
$ 7,726.80
$ 5,446.29

$ 24,461.00
$

532.46

$
330.26
$148,881.40*"

The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond is supplemented in

the amount of $136,800.99, the amount of the Judgment as of

-3- ooooio

August 1,

1990

($839,208.99).

($976,009.98)

less

the

security

thereon

The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond awarding a

supersedeas bond in the amount of $79,793.36 (which was the
anticipated interest accruing for one year post-judgment) together

with

the

Tracy

Collins

bond

in

the

amount

of

$28,570.63, the cash bond of $2,400 and Lot 6 and the unplatted property valued at $728,445.00 secure the Judgment in
the amount of $839,208.99.

The Judgment as of September 1,

1990, as supplemented herein, amounts to $976,009.98 —
cipal and

pre- and

post-judgment

interest

thereon

prinin the

amount of $715,664.30, plus costs in the amount of $228,740.93
plus pre- and post-judgment
amount of $31,604.75.

interest on such costs in the

See attached Exhibit "A," the Calcula-

tion of Supersedeas Bond.
3.

The attorney's

fees

requested

with regard to the

"Settlement," in the amount of $473.78, and "Tracy Collins
Appeal," in the amount of $24,381.51, as set forth on the Summary are taken under advisement.
4.

Plaintiffs are ordered to post additional security as

a supersedeas bond for the continued stay of the execution of
the Judgment pursuant to the Order Re: Supersedeas Bond dated
March 17, 1989 in the amount of $136,800.99 on or before
March 15, 1990.

If Plaintiffs fail to do so by March 15,

1990, the Order Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989
shall be automatically vacated and the Sharps shall be allowed

000011

to proceed to execute on the Judgment entered in the above
captioned matter.
DATED t h i s

vk

]tlftf^

d a y of

BY THE

-5-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused true and correct copies of
the foregoing proposed ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS* SECOND MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO INCREASE LIABILITY ON BOND
and THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF ALBERT D. NYSTRCM to be hand delivered
on this *l ***ciay of March, 1990, to the following:
i
i

}

J

Stanford B. Owen, Esq.
Patrick L. Anderson, Esc.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
Post Office Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
Glen D. Watkins, Esc.
Mark R. Gaylcrd, Esc.
ANDERSON & WATKINS
700 Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018
and to be mailed, postage prepaid, on this

/-

day of March,

1990, to the following:
John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Post Office Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

hmteL^P^
^MVUUP

-O'
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CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
Trust Deed Note
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Principal
Interest - March 22, 1988
Interest - March 22, 1988 through
September 26, 1988 ($183.32 x 188 days)
Late Payment Penalty
SUBTOTAL:

(e)

Post-Judgment Interest —
September 26, 1988 through
August 1, 1990 ($183.32 x 674 days)
SUBTOTAL:

$371,739.35
171,033.54
34,464.16
14,869.57
$592,106.62

123,557.68
$715,664.30

Costs
(a) Trustees Fees
$ 1,803.80
(b) Court Costs
2,881.04
(c) Attorney's Fees
(i)
Awarded in Judgment
144,088.75
(ii) Third Affidavit plus fees
requested in Motion less fees in
amount of $24,938.89 under advisement
79,967.34
SUBTOTAL:

$228,740.9 3

Interest
(a)

Legal Fees paid to August 1, 1990
($24,461.00 plus pre-judgment
interest of $5,800.77)
(b) Trustees Fees to August 1, 1990
($.49 x 674 days plus pre-judgment
interest of $230.63)
(c) Court costs to August 1, 1990
($.79 x 674 days plus pre-judgment
interest of $249.63) *

$ 30,261.77
560.89
782.09

SUBTOTAL:

$ 31,604.75

TOTAL:

$976,009,98

000014

CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
( P a g e 2)

_Security
(a) Lot 6 and Unplatted Property
(b) Temporary Restraining Order Bonds
(i) Cash Bond
(ii) Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. Bond
(c) Supersedeas Bond
TOTAL: (With Tracy Collins Bond)

$728,445.00
2,400.00
28,570.63
79,793.36
$839,208.99

Additional Security Necessary
(a) Judgment as of August 1, 1990
(b) LESS: Present Security

$976,009.98
839,208.99

ADDITIONAL SECURITY NEEDED:
(With Tracy Collins Bond)

-2-
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$136,800.99

MAY 1 h J ^3

Donald J. Winder (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis (#4022)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222

'"•A
? as J«• v-'~V-"~-»•r-'* T

Attorneys for Defendants Sharp

•-•;>

3

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al.,

AMENDED
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO
INCREASE LIABILITY ON BOND

Plaintiffs,
-vJOHN C. SHARP, et al.,
Defendants.

3LV\ 3 . 2 . ^

JOHN C. SHARP, et al.
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C87-1621
-vJudge J. Dennis Frederick
ROBERT FELTON, et al.,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

Defendants1

Second

Motion

to

Supplement

Judgment

and

Motion to Increase Liability on Bond came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable J, Dennis Frederick on Monday,
the 12th day of February, 1990 at the hour of 10:30 a.m.

The

Sharps were represented by their counsel Donald J. Winder and
Kathy A. F. Davis.

Plaintiffs were

000016

represented

by their

counsel Robert M. Anderson and Mark Gaylord.

The Court, hav-

ing reviewed the pleadings and memoranda on file herein, having heard the arguments of counsel, having received the proffers of counsel for the Sharps, and good cause appearing I
therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
I
1.

Taxes on Lot 1 as described in the final recorded [

plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I in the principal amount of I
$2,271.48 plus penalties and interest thereon be paid on or ;
before March 15, 1990.

If the plaintiffs fail to pay the

taxes due and owing on Lot 1 by March 15, 1990, the Order
Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989 shall be automatically vacated and defendants shall be allowed to proceed to
execute on the Judgment and this Order entered herein.

Subse-

quent to the Court's ruling, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Payment or Property Taxes Pursuant to the Court's Order dated
February 22, 1990.
2.

The Judgment entered in this matter on September 26,

1988 is hereby supplemented through February 12, 1990 by the i
amount of $231,636.97 for a total Judgment of $938,053.02 as j
of February 12, 1990.

The supplementation includes the fol- '
s

lowing amounts:
a.

I
Attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily in- !
i

curred by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October \
31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes i
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plaintiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants' j
2

""

000017

I

Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary"): "Settlement" in the
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $84.00;
"Tracy Collins Appeal" in the amount of $24,381.51

(for a

total of $24,938.89);
b.

The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment

from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the attorney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid through
September 26, 1988 as follows:
(1) Principal from 3/22/88
to 9/26/88:
(2) Attorney's fees:
(3) Court costs:
(4) Trustee's fees:
TOTAL:
c.

$34,464.16
$ 5,800.77
$
249.63
$
230.93
$40,745.49

The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on

payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment
from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through February 12,
1990 as follows:
(1) Principal
($183.32 x 504 days
9/26/88 - 2/12/90):
$ 92,393.28
(2) Attorney's fees:
Paid Prior to Judgment
(i) (Second Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom
9/27/88 - 10/31/89): $11,287.91
(ii) ($28.20 x 104 days
10/31/88 - 2/12/90): $ 2,932.80
Paid Post-Judgment
(9/26/88 - 2/12/90)
(i) (Third Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom
$5,446.29 - $1,781.26,
(interest backed out,
2/13/90 - 8/1/90,
169 days x $10.54): $ 3,665.03 $ 17,885.74

~3~
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(3) Court costs
($.79 x 504 days
9/26/88 - 2/12/90):
(4) Trustee's fees:
($.49 x 504 days
9/26/88 - 2/12/90)
TOTAL:
3.

$

398.16

$

246.96

$110,924.14

The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond entered on March 17,

1989 is hereby supplemented through August 1, 1990 in the following amounts:
a.
curred

Attorney's fees reasonably

and necessarily in-

by the Sharps from September 1, 1988 through October

31, 1989 in the amount of $79,967.34, which amount excludes
the following categories set forth in the Summary of Plain- '
tiffs' Objections to Attorney's Fees presented as Defendants'
Exhibit 2 at the hearing (the "Summary'1): "Settlement" in the
amount of $473.38; "Attorney's fees" in the amount of $84.00;
"Tracy

Collins

Appeal"

in

the

amount

of $24,381.51

(for a

total of $24,938.89);

'
!

b.

The pre-judgment interest accrued on the Judgment

(

i

from the date it accrued on the principal or the date the at- •
torney's fees, court costs or trustee's fees were paid through
September 26, 1988 as follows:
(1) Principal from 3/22/88
to 9/26/88:
(2) Attorney's fees:
(3) Court costs:
(4) Trustee's fees:
TOTAL:
c.

$34,464. if,
$ 5,800.77
$
249.63
$
230.93
$40,745.49

The post-judgment interest, excluding interest on |

payments made after October 31, 1989, accruing on the Judgment '

-4-
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from the date thereof (September 26, 1988) through August 1,
1990 as follows:
(1) Principal ($183.32 x
674 days):
(2) Attorney's fees:
Paid Prior to Judgment
(Second Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom)
($28.20 x 274 days)
Paid Post-Judgment
(Third Affidavit of
Albert D. Nystrom)
(3) Court costs ($.79 x
674 days):
(4) Trustee's fees ($.49 x
674 days):

$123,557.68

$11,287.91
$ 7,726.80
$ 5,446.29

TOTAL:
d.

$ 24,461.00
$

532.46

$

330.26

$148,881.40

The Order Re: Supersedeas Bond is supplemented in

the amount of $136,800.99, through August 1, 1990 ($976,009.98)
less the security thereon ($839,208.99).
sedeas Bond
$79,793.36

awarding

a supersedeas

The Order Re: Super-

bond

in the amount of

(which was the anticipated interest accruing for

one year post-judgment), together with the Tracy Collins bond
in the amount of $28,570.63, the cash bond of $2,400 and Lot 6
and the unplatted property valued at $728,445.00 previously
secured

the

Judgment

in the

amount

of $839,208.^9.

See

attached Exhibit "A," the Calculation of Supersedeas Bond.
4.

The

attorney's

fees

requested

with regard

to the

"Settlement," in the amount of $473.78, and "Tracy Collins
Appeal," in the amount of $24,381.51, as set forth on the Summary are taken under advisement.

_5_
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5.

Plaintiffs are ordered to post additional security as

a supersedeas bond for the continued stay of the execution of
the Judgment pursuant to the Order Re: Supersedeas Bond dated
March

17, 1989 in the amount of $136,800.99 on or before

March 15, 1990.

If Plaintiffs fail to do so by March 15,

1990, the Order Staying Proceedings dated January 31, 1989
shall be automatically vacated and the Sharps shall be allowed
to proceed to execute on the Judgment entered in the above
captioned matter
DATED this

M * ^ d a y oi

-6-

, 1990.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused true and correct copies of
the foregoing proposed AMENDED ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S SECOND
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO INCREASE LIABILITY
ON BOND to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on this O Q,
day of April, 1990, to the following:
Stanford B. Owen, Esq.
Patrick L. Anderson, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
Post Office Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
Glen D. Watkins, Esq.
ANDERSON & WATKINS
700 Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1018
John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Post Office Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
David L. Gladwell
Chapter 7 Trustee
Post Office Box 3205
Ogden, Utah 84409
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EXHIBIT MAM
CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
Trust Deed Note
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Principal
Interest - March 22, 1988
Interest - March 22, 1988 through
September 26, 1988 ($183.32 x 188 days)
Late Payment Penalty
SUBTOTAL:

(e)

Post-Judgment Interest —
September 26, 1988 through
August 1, 1990 ($183.32 x 674 days)
SUBTOTAL:

$371,739.35
171,033.54
34,464.16
14,869.57
$592,106.62

123,557.68
$715,664.30

Costs
(a)
(b)
(c)

Trustees Fees
$ 1,803.80
Court Costs
2,881.04
Attorney's Fees
(i)
Awarded in Judgment
144,088.75
(ii) Third Affidavit plus fees
requested in Motion less fees in
amount of $24,938.89 under advisement
79,967.34
SUBTOTAL:

$228,740.93

Interest
(a)
(b)
(c)

Legal Fees paid to August 1, 1990
($24,461.00 plus pre-judgment
interest of $5,800.77)
Trustees Fees to August 1, 1990
($.49 x 674 days plus pre-judgment
interest of $230.63)
Court costs to August 1, 1990
($.79 x 674 days plus pre-judgment
interest of $249.63)

$ 30,261.77
560.89
782.09

SUBTOTAL:

$ 31,604.75

TOTAL:

$976.009.98
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CALCULATION OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
(Page 2)
Security
(a)
(b)
(c)

Lot 6 and Unplatted Property
Temporary Restraining Order Bonds
(i) Cash Bond
(ii) Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. Bond
Supersedeas Bond

$728,445.00

TOTAL: (With Tracy Collins Bond)

$839,208.99

2,400.00
28,570.63
79,793.36

Additional Security Necessary
(a)
(b)

As of August 1, 1990
LESS: Present Security

$976,009.98
839,208.99

ADDITIONAL SECURITY NEEDED:
(With Tracy Collins Bond)

_2_
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$136,800.99

